

Top Secret



DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Central Intelligence Bulletin

Top Secret

25X1



C 207
13 October 1972

25X1

State Department review completed



25X1

Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A023000010002-3

Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A023000010002-3

13 October 1972

Central Intelligence Bulletin

CONTENTS

USSR - WEST GERMANY: Soviets take reserved attitude
on inter-German talks. (Page 2)

25X1

IRAN: Opium poppy growing to be curtailed. (Page 7)

25X1

25X1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

USSR - WEST GERMANY: The Soviets showed no inclination to influence East Germany's position in the inter-German talks during conversations with Bonn's State Secretary Egon Bahr earlier this week.

In a report to Allied ambassadors on 11 October, Bahr said that party chief Brezhnev and Foreign Minister Gromyko adopted very reserved attitudes and, though willing to exchange information, they emphasized that decisions regarding the FRG-GDR treaty negotiations could not be made in Moscow. Accordingly, Bahr said no progress was made on the central issues impeding the inter-German talks. In fact, the Soviets asked Bonn to withdraw its demand that the inter-German treaty contain references to a single German nation and to the lack of a final peace treaty. They stated that the latter would imply that the non-aggression treaty ratified by Bonn and Moscow last May was of limited validity.

The Soviets did indicate willingness to consider Allied demands for a quadripartite declaration on Berlin. Brezhnev stated that Moscow was no longer opposed to the idea and Gromyko assured Bahr that "contacts" had already begun. There was no indication, however, of Soviet acceptance of Western demands that the declaration be concluded prior to the inter-German treaty.

According to Bahr, Brezhnev adopted a more positive tone on other issues of Allied concern. He confirmed the timetable for talks on European security arrangements conveyed to Dr. Kissinger in Moscow last month, and told Bahr that he no longer believed it necessary to conclude a security conference before preparatory talks on troop reductions begin. Brezhnev professed that at least a start in negotiations on force reductions in Europe was needed, and that Moscow saw no value in returning to the Cold War.

The reserved attitude taken at this stage by Brezhnev and Gromyko on the inter-German talks probably was designed to counter any impression that Bahr had succeeded in going over the head of Pankow to gain concessions. Soviet willingness to pressure

25X1 .

Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A023000010002-3

East Germany probably will be reflected only in the inter-German talks themselves, although no progress was made in talks following Bahr's return to Bonn. Both Moscow and Pankow probably prefer to withhold significant concessions until the West German elections draw closer in the hope that electoral pressures on Brandt will result in at least some give in the West German position.

25X1

25X1

13 Oct 72

Central Intelligence Bulletin

3

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A023000010002-3

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

IRAN: Tehran has decided to reduce its authorized area for opium poppy cultivation next year by 90 percent, according to a government official.

The decision was taken because there is enough opium in storage from legal cultivation and seizures of illicit traffic to supply Iran's registered addicts for about a year. This implies that the government has decided not to lower the age of eligibility for addiction registration from the current 60 years. There are more than 100,000 registered opium addicts in Iran, with perhaps triple that number ineligible or not registered.

Iran reinstated the legal cultivation of poppy four years ago, after 14 years of prohibition, in an effort to meet the needs of its large addict population, eliminate the smuggling trade, and prevent the loss of foreign exchange. The apparent decision not to enlarge the rolls of registered users by lowering the age requirement will probably result in continued illegal drug sales and continued, perhaps even increased, smuggling, possibly straining Iranian enforcement agencies. Moreover, unless the government indemnifies former growers, they may well engage in illicit cultivation, a practice that now appears under control.

Reduction of the 1973 crop illustrates Iran's ability to make drastic alterations in its poppy cultivation program whenever it so desires. The Shah is able to do this because of the rigidly enforced controls over the production and processing of opium. According to the US Embassy, Tehran is considering citing the cut in cultivation area to dramatize to neighboring producing countries its long-standing offer to cease poppy growing completely if they agree to do so. After 1973, the government will probably adjust upward the amount of opium it allows to be grown for its registered users. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

13 Oct 72

Central Intelligence Bulletin

7

25X1

Next 6 Page(s) In Document Exempt

25X1

~~Top Secret~~

For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A023000010002-3



~~Top Secret~~

Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A023000010002-3